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35.1 Introduction
The concept of  innateness has led a busy life. Within the sciences, it has historically exerted an 
influence in many regions of  biology; and though its explicit role in the life sciences has waned 
in recent decades, it continues to play a significant role in cognitive science – especially, develop-
mental psychology and linguistics. Yet, the concept of  innateness is quite unlike many that 
figure in science. Whereas the concepts of  a Higgs boson or lateral geniculate nucleus, for 
example, are products of  science and make little sense independently of  this context, the c oncept 
of  innateness has led a life outside the lab. Discussions of  innateness appear in works of  both 
Western philosophy (Cowie 1999) and Chinese philosophy (Fung 1953; Wong 2012) that long 
predate modern science. Moreover, the concept appears to have a place in our ordinary folk 
understanding as well. Even if  many people rarely come across the actual English word “innate,” 
they can easily understand the claim that certain capacities are “just built into us,” a product of  
nature, or “in our genes.”
The role of  the concept of  innateness – especially in the sciences – has also been contentious. 
According to the standard criticism, widely endorsed by philosophers and theoretically oriented 
biologists, the concept of  innateness is unfit for scientific purposes because it encodes a prescien-
tific conception of  development that conflates several distinct biological issues and thereby leads 
researchers to commit fallacies of  ambiguity (Bateson 1991; Griffiths 2002). Furthermore, the 
most vociferous recent advocates of  this standard criticism maintain that it is bolstered by 
empirical research on innateness judgments (Griffiths, Machery, and Linquist 2009).
This chapter has a pair of  aims. The first is to provide an overview of  some recent efforts to 
empirically study the innateness concept, both as deployed in folk contexts and among scientists. 
The second aim is to consider whether this research really bolsters the standard criticism. In 
Section 35.2, I describe research by Paul Griffiths and his collaborators, which seeks to assess 
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whether the folk concept of  innateness is a manifestation of  our folk biology. In Section 35.3, I 
consider whether, as Griffiths et al. maintain, this research bolsters the standard criticism. In 
Section 35.4, I review further research, largely due to josh Knobe and Richard Samuels, on folk 
innateness judgments; and in Section 35.5 I describe how this research was extended in order to 
explore the issue of  whether scientists’ innateness judgments rely on a distinctly scientific 
i nnateness concept, or whether they merely redeploy the folk concept. Finally, in Section 35.6, 
I conclude with some very brief  comments on the implications of  this research.
35.2 Folk Innateness judgments: The Innateness Concept  
as a Manifestation of  Our Folk Biology
Philosophers have long sought to analyze the concept of  innateness (Stich 1975); and over the 
past few decades a number of  explicit definitions have been proposed. (For surveys see Samuels 
2004; and Mameli and Bateson 2011). Experimental studies of  the innateness concept are quite 
different in emphasis. Rather than seeking to define “innate,” the goal has been to describe the 
sort of  mental processes and representations that underlie our thought about innateness. In this 
section, I set out one intriguing proposal, initially suggested by Paul Griffiths (2002), and later 
explored by Griffiths in collaboration with Edouard Machery, Stephan Linquist, and Karola Stotz. 
According to this proposal, which they call the three‐feature hypothesis, the concept of  innateness 
is a manifestation of  certain core aspects of  our folk biology (Griffiths 2002; Griffiths, Machery, 
and Linquist 2009; Linquist et al. 2011).
35.2.1 Background: Folk Essentialism
Let me start by laying some background in place. Over the past four decades, naïve thought 
about the biological world has been a focus of  intensive study among cognitive psychologists, 
anthropologists, and developmentalists. Although much controversy remains (see, e.g., Sloutsky, 
Kloos, and Fisher 2007), there is fairly widespread consensus concerning certain core aspects of  
our folk biology – aspects that Griffiths and his collaborators rely on in developing their hypo-
thesis. Crucially, there is considerable agreement that quotidian thought about the biological 
realm is a manifestation of  folk essentialism. When ordinary people draw inferences or make 
judgments about biological phenomena, they tend to suppose that organisms possess a hidden 
causal essence or inner nature — a property or set of  properties that is possessed by the organism 
throughout its life, and which both defines its kind membership and causes it to possess kind‐
typical properties (Medin and Ortony 1989; Atran 1990; Gelman 2003). On this view, for 
example, people tacitly suppose that what makes an organism a tiger with typical tigerish char-
acteristics is that throughout its life it possesses a hidden species essence that causes the organism 
to exhibit such species typical properties as being four‐legged, fury, and striped. Furthermore, 
this bias appears not to be an artifact of  local cultural mores. Rather, what evidence there is 
s uggests that folk essentialism is pan‐cultural, and that it emerges reliably, and quite early in 
development (Atran 1998).
Although folk essentialism has been invoked to explain a broad array of  psychological phe-
nomena, for present purposes the most relevant is a tendency, shared by adults and children alike, to 
suppose that species typical traits are insensitive to environmental variation. For example, when 
asked to imagine a cow that has been raised by pigs, adults routinely assume that the cow will display 
normal bovine traits, such as mooing instead of  oinking (Atran et al. 2001). Folk essentialism readily 
explains this fact because if  people assume that an organism will possess the same species essence 
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throughout its life, then an organism’s species typical traits – which are a product of  this essence – 
should be expected to develop across an exceedingly broad range of  environments.
35.2.2 The Three‐Feature Hypothesis
We are now in a position to set out the three‐feature hypothesis. It can be divided into two main 
parts. The first is that folk judgments about innateness reflect our ordinary tendency to think in 
essentialist terms about biological kinds (Griffiths 2002; Griffiths, Machery, and Linquist 2009). 
Specifically, Griffiths and his collaborators propose the following:
Essentialist Thesis: naïve subjects judge a trait as innate when it is categorized as a product of  the 
organism’s species essence.
But on what basis do people work out whether a trait is an expression of  a species essence and, 
hence, innate? Here’s where the second part of  the hypothesis comes in. According to Griffiths 
and his collaborators:
Categorization Thesis: naïve subjects categorize a trait as a product of  the organism’s species essence 
largely on the basis of  the extent to which it exhibits three features: fixity, species typicality, and tele-
ology (or functionality).
Roughly, a trait is fixed to the extent that its possession is unaffected by environmental varia-
tion; a trait is species typical to the extent that it possessed by all members of  the species that are 
not abnormal; and a trait is teleological to the extent that it contributes to the well‐being of  the 
organism which possesses it. Other factors may, Griffiths et al. suppose, exert an influence; but 
these three are central. Furthermore, and more stringently, they hypothesize that evidence of  
fixity, typicality and teleology are independent of  each other, and consequently, they predict that 
these three features will contribute additively to judgments about whether some trait is innate.
The above earlier proposal requires a bit more unpacking. In particular, it is important to 
appreciate how the Essentialist and Categorization theses are connected – why the Essentialist 
Thesis should lead Griffiths et al. to suppose that innateness judgments are largely determined by 
fixity, typicality, and teleology. In light of  our earlier discussion of  folk essentialism, it should be 
pretty obvious why typicality and fixity are relevant. Evidence that a trait is species typical should 
increase the probability that it is judged to be an expression of  a species essence, hence innate, 
because, by assumption, species typical traits are products of  a species essence. Similarly, e vidence 
that a trait is fixed should raise the probability that it is judged innate because, by hypothesis, 
essences are invariant over the lifespan of  the organism, and the traits they produce are insensitive 
to environmental influence.
It is rather less obvious, however, why evidence of  functionality should raise the probability 
that a trait is judged innate. As Griffiths et al. clearly recognize, this assumption does not flow 
directly from the hypothesis that we are folk essentialists. As a consequence, they cite various 
auxiliary considerations in order to bolster the claim that teleology is relevant. For example, they 
note the cross‐cultural tendency for people to invoke teleology in explaining why animals and 
plants possess traits (Atran 1995); and (quite unrelatedly) they note that some scientists and phi-
losophers have suggested that “innate” should be analyzed to mean “designed by natural selec-
tion.” These considerations are, however, clearly auxiliary to the core idea that innate traits are 
an expression of  an organism’s species essence; and as such, the status of  teleology seems quite 
unlike that of  fixity and typicality. I return to this point later on, but first we need to consider the 
empirical support for the three‐feature hypothesis.
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35.2.3 Experimental Study
Suppose the three‐feature hypothesis is correct. Then we should expect the following:
Prediction 1: When a trait is associated with any of  the three features – fixity, typicality and 
teleology – participants will be more likely to judge the trait innate.
Prediction 2: All three features will contribute independently to participants’ judgments about 
the trait’s innateness.
To test these predictions, Griffiths and his collaborators ran a series of  studies in which they 
p resented vignettes describing the song of  different bird species (Griffiths, Machery, and Linquist 
2009; Linquist et al. 2011). The vignettes systematically varied whether a trait was species 
t ypical, whether its development was dependent on the environment and whether it was 
functional. More specifically, each probe was organized in the following manner:
•	 First, there is an initial paragraph about research on birdsong, designed to convince partici-
pants that there is a wealth of  well‐established scientific knowledge about birdsong.
•	 The next paragraph begins with one or two sentences, designed to convince participants that 
the animal is real, naming a specific bird and providing some neutral information about it.
•	 The remainder of  the second paragraph states whether the song of  the male of  this species 
is fixed, typical, teleological, or their opposites, using one of  each of  these pairs of  
statements:
Fixed/Plastic
0.  Studies on ___________ show that the song an adult male produces depends on which 
songs they hear when they are young.
1.  Studies on ___________ show that the song an adult male produces does not depend on 
which songs they hear when they are young.
Typical/Typical
0. Studies also show that different males in this species sing different songs.
1. Studies also show that all males of  this species sing the same song.
Teleology/Teleology
0.  Close observations of  these birds reveal that the males’ song is not used to attract mates 
or to defend territories. Scientists therefore agree that this feature of  the bird has no real 
function, like the appendix in humans.
1.  Close observations of  these birds reveal that the males’ song attracts mates and helps to 
defend their territory. Scientists therefore agree that this feature of  the bird has a real 
function, like the heart in humans.
•	 Finally, the probe concludes with a question of  the following form:
On a 7‐point scale, 1 meaning strongly disagree and 7 meaning strongly agree, how would 
you respond to the following statement?
“The song of  the male _______ is innate.”
To illustrate, here is the probe describing a species of  bird in which birdsong is not‐typical but is 
fixed and has a function:
Birdsong is one of  the most intensively studied aspects of  animal behaviour. Since the 1950s s cientists 
have used recordings and sound spectograms to uncover the structure and function of  birdsong. 
neuroscientists have investigated in great detail the areas of  the brain that allow birds to develop and 
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produce their songs. Other scientists have done ecological fieldwork to study what role song plays in 
the lives of  different birds.
The Alder Flycatcher (Empidonax alnorum) is a migratory neo‐tropical bird which breeds in 
southern Canada and the northern uSA. Studies on the Alder Flycatcher show that the song an adult 
male produces does not depend on which songs they hear when they are young. Studies also show 
that different males in this species sing different songs. Furthermore, close observations of  these birds 
reveal that the males’ song attracts mates and helps to defend their territory. Scientists therefore agree 
that the bird’s song has a real function, like the heart in humans.
On a 7‐point scale, 1 meaning strongly disagree and 7 meaning strongly agree, how would you 
respond to the following statement?
“The song of  the male Alder Flycatcher is innate.”
Griffiths and his collaborators used vignettes of  this sort in three different studies, two of  which 
have a between‐subjects design, another within‐subjects. What they consistently found is that 
(1) typicality and fixity are both significant predictors of  folk judgments about innateness; (2) 
fixity explains more of  the variance than typicality; and (3) the influence of  these two factors is 
additive. These results comport well with the three‐feature hypothesis. In contrast, the data on 
teleology is far less clear, and fit far less well. At best, teleology appears to be a marginally 
significant predictor of  innateness judgments – explaining only a very small part of  the variance. 
But in two of  their experiments – both of  which had between‐subject designs – teleology had no 
significant effect at all on judgments of  innateness.
35.2.4 Follow‐up Study
The three‐feature hypothesis predicts that teleology should exert a significant influence on folk 
innateness judgments. Why then did it exert so little influence, and what implications does this 
have for the three‐feature hypothesis? Clearly, the data provide little reason to reject the Essentialist 
Thesis. But it may appear to undermine the Categorization Thesis since only two of  the three pro-
posed features make a significant contribution to folk innateness judgments. But why is it that 
teleology exerted so little influence? This is a question that Griffiths and collaborators sought to 
address in a follow‐up study (Linquist et al. 2011).
Perhaps the most obvious explanation for why teleology exerts so little influence is that, con-
trary to what Griffith et al. assume, the Categorization Thesis is false: Our folk biology does not 
construe essence‐produced traits as teleological. And, as a matter of  fact, there is little direct 
e vidence that subjects do view essence‐produced traits in this way. This is why, as noted earlier, 
when Griffiths et al. argue for the inclusion of  teleology, they resort to considerations that are 
more‐or‐less independent of  the Essentialist Thesis. But if  this is true – if  there is little reason to 
suppose that subjects think of  essence‐linked traits as functional – then Griffiths et al.’s data 
a ctually fit better with the Essentialist Thesis than would have been the case had teleology turned 
out to be an important factor. In short: on the present view, the evidence against the Categorization 
Thesis actually supports the Essentialist Thesis.
There is a second intriguing possibility, however, which Linquist et al. (2011) explore. Rather 
than rejecting the Categorization Thesis, they suggest that our folk biology does treat essence‐
p roduced traits as teleological, but that teleology fails to influence verbal assertions involving the 
English word “innate” because – for whatever reason – “innate” is not especially effective at 
“tapping into” our underlying folk biological theory. If  this were true, they suggest, one might 
expect other English expressions to do a better job at satisfying the Categorization Thesis; and as 
matter of  fact, this appears to be the case – at least among Anglophone undergraduates. 
Specifically, in their 2011 study, Linquist et al. posed tasks very similar to those outlined earlier, 
except that they used the expression “in its DnA” instead of  “innate.” This manipulation was 
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guided by the hunch that the relatively colloquial expression “in its DnA” would – at least for 
naïve undergraduate participants – do a better job of  tapping into our folk biology than the some-
what antiquated word “innate.” What they found was that for judgments concerning whether 
an organism’s trait is “in its DnA,” the three‐features – fixity, typicality, and teleology – explain 
far more of  the variance than they do for innateness judgments: 46% as opposed to 16%. 
Moreover, they found that teleology alone is a good predictor of  judgments about whether a trait 
is in the DnA, and indeed a better predictor than typicality is.
Although the findings outlined in the previous paragraph are consistent with the three‐
feature hypothesis, they also raise a range of  issues that require further clarification and explora-
tion. One such issue concerns why we should accept the assumption that “in its DnA” is eliciting 
judgments that depend on the very same cognitive structures as those elicited by “innate.” 
Minimally, in its present form, the three‐feature hypothesis leaves it a mystery why an inversion 
in the significance of  teleological considerations should occur, if  “innate” and “in its DnA” both 
rely on the same essentialist folk biology. Furthermore, there is an obvious alternative hypothesis 
that merits consideration. Given the recent and purely scientific provenance of  talk about DnA, 
it may be that “in its DnA” elicits judgments that rely on a distinct but related set of  semi‐scientific 
concepts. Among other things, such a proposal would explain the heavier weighting of  teleolog-
ical considerations, if  (as I suspect) many people associate DnA with the process of  evolution by 
natural selection – a commonly made connection is popular scientific works, such as Dawkins’ 
The Selfish Gene.
35.3 Does Empirical Research on the Three‐Feature Hypothesis  
Bolster the Standard Criticism?
Although one major goal of  Griffiths et al.’s research is simply to understand the psychological 
basis of  innateness judgments, they also maintain that it has implications for longstanding 
debates over the scientific legitimacy of  the innateness concept. Specifically, they maintain that:
The data from our … empirical studies bolsters the standard scientific criticism of  the concept, which 
is that it conflates a number of  different ideas and leads to fallacies of  ambiguity (Griffiths, Machery, 
and Linquist 2009, 624).
In what follows, I set out this criticism in more detail, and argue that the extant research fails to 
support this contention.
35.3.1 Innateness as a “Tonkish” Concept
In a well‐known paper on logical connectives, Arthur Prior discussed a connective, TOnK, which 
everyone would consider defective because it permits, via repeated applications of  its introduction 
and elimination rules, the inferring of  anything from anything else (Prior 1967). Griffiths and 
his collaborators, of  course, never suggest that innateness is nearly so permissive. But they do 
suggest that it is “tonkish” in that it licenses illicit patterns of  inference from one claim that we 
have reason to endorse, to others that are entirely unwarranted (Machery, 2014). Specifically, 
they contend that the innateness concept permits one to illegitimately infer from the trait’s pos-
session of  one of  the three features, to its possession of  the others.
Suppose, for example, that one has evidence that an organism’s fur color is species‐typical. 
Then since the influence of  typicality on innateness judgments is independent, one might make 
the following “introduction” inference:
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Trait x is typical
Trait x is innate
More generally, because the three features exert an independent influence
… people need not know whether a trait is fixed or has a function to decide whether it is innate on the 
basis of  evidence about typicality (and vice versa). Thus, if  they are told that a trait is species‐typical, 
people may well infer that it is innate.
But presumably we also make “elimination” inferences, from a trait’s being innate to its posses-
sion of  other properties – for example,
Trait x is innate
Trait x has a function
But if  this is so, then the concept of  innateness would appear to license inferences from justifiable 
claims –in our example, the trait’s species‐typicality – to quite different, and entirely unsupported 
conclusions (e.g., that the trait is functional). As Griffiths et al. put it:
Having judged that [a trait] is innate, people are likely to infer that it is fixed—that its development 
does not depend on its environment. Or if  they are told that a trait has a function, people may infer on 
that basis alone that it is innate. Having judged that it is innate, they are likely to conclude that it is 
species‐typical (and so on).
In which case, it might seem that the innateness concept is tonkish and, hence, defective. 
Furthermore, if  innate is defective in this fashion, then it may seem reasonable to conclude that 
it ought not to be deployed in the sciences, where the avoidance of  equivocation and intellectual 
confusion are presumably quite desirable.
35.3.2 Why the Extant Empirical Research Fails to Bolster the Standard Criticism
The research outlined earlier fails to bolster the Standard Criticism. First, in order to sustain the 
claim that the innateness concept is tonkish, one needs evidence concerning both introduction 
inferences (e.g., from fixity to innateness) and elimination inferences (e.g., from innateness to 
t ypicality). It is only if  both exhibit the right inferential profile that the concept will behave in a 
tonkish manner. But as a matter of  fact, the Griffiths et al. studies say nothing whatsoever about 
elimination inferences. Rather, they wholly concern introduction inferences. And what the 
e vidence at most suggests is that innateness judgments are made on the basis of  multiple disso-
ciable factors. The same is true, however, of  many concepts – including many that figure in 
scientific contexts. For example, scientists judge a substance to be a mineral on the basis of  
m ultiple dissociable factors – for example, whether it is naturally occurring, stable at room 
t emperature, and abiogenic. But it would surely be implausible to conclude from this alone that 
the mineral concept should be expunged from science.
Second, it’s unclear how Griffiths et al.’s studies could provide very much support for the 
s tandard criticism, since it’s far from clear that they tell us much about innateness judgments in 
science. The point is an obvious one. The research conducted by Griffiths and his collaborators 
focuses on folk applications of  the term “innate.” But such research will not do much to bolster 
the standard criticism, unless we have reason to suppose that innateness judgments in science 
deploy the very same conceptual resources. Yet, the studies outlined earlier are silent on this 
matter. Moreover, we ought not to assume that the same concept is operative merely because the 
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same word, “innate,” is being used in both contexts. After all, there are a great many examples of  
words that express quite different concepts in folk and scientific contexts. “Heat,” “weight” and 
“velocity” come readily to mind (Carey 1992). In which case, even if  the earlier studies established 
the tonkishness of  the folk innateness concept – which they do not – this alone would do little to 
support the contention that scientific usage is similarly problematic.
One obvious question, then, is whether scientists deploy the same concept of  innateness as the 
folk? In Section 35.5, I focus on this issue. But first I need to describe another strand of  research 
on folk innateness judgments – this time from work by josh Knobe and Richard Samuels (Knobe 
and Samuels 2013).
35.4 More on Folk Innateness judgments
In their work on folk innateness judgments Knobe and Samuels focused primarily on two questions:
•	 To what extent do learning theoretic considerations influence folk innateness judgments?
•	 Are folk innateness judgments influenced by value judgments?
Both questions were motivated, in large measure, by what they saw as central aspects of  the way 
in which cognitive scientists use the concept of  innateness. Specifically, on the basis of  an 
assessment of  published research on innateness hypotheses, they argued that learning theoretic 
considerations appear very important to whether cognitive scientists count a trait as innate, but 
that considerations of  value appear, on the face of  it, to exert little or no influence. As such, 
Knobe and Samuels’ work on folk judgments was a preliminary to considering whether scientists 
in the relevant fields deploy a folk concept of  innateness or some distinctly scientific one.
35.4.1 Learning and Folk Innateness Judgments
It is widely supposed in cognitive science and allied disciplines that there is an important connec-
tion between innateness and learning. Indeed some very influential cognitive scientists go so far 
as to maintain that the two concepts are inter‐defined – that innate traits just are those that are 
not the output of  learning processes (Carey 2010). But even if  this claim about the definition of  
innateness is untrue, it is still the case that in published research it is invariably assumed that a 
trait will not count as innate, if  an organism acquires it by perceiving its environment and 
engaging in straightforward learning. Within cognitive science, then, it appears to be no more 
than a banal truism that learned traits are not innate.
Should we expect folk innateness judgments to conform to this banal truism? If  the three‐
f eature hypothesis is correct, then we should not. More precisely, the hypothesis predicts that 
when all three features are held constant, folk innateness judgments should not be sensitive to 
the distinction between learned and non‐learned capacities.
In order to test this prediction, Knobe and Samuels presented vignettes to 60 Yale students 
that were based on the “bird” vignettes used by Griffiths and his collaborators. But rather than 
varying the fixity, typicality or functionality of  the trait, participants were instead randomly 
assigned to a “learning condition” in which the trait was said to have been learned or to a 
“n euroscience condition” in which the trait was described as the product of  a “brute casual” pro-
cess. Participants in the learning condition received the following vignette:
Bird navigation is one of  the most intensively studied aspects of  animal behavior. Since the 1950s 
scientists have investigated in great detail the processes by which birds develop the ability to 
navigate.
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The Alder Flycatcher (Empidonax alnorum) is a migratory neo‐tropical bird that breeds in southern 
Canada and the northern uSA. Studies of  the Alder Flycatcher show that, like many birds, they have 
the ability to use the sun as a “celestial compass.” That is, they are able to combine information about 
the sun’s position and the time of  day, in order to determine direction of  flight.
Though this ability to navigate by the sun develops rapidly in fledgling Flycatcher, studies have 
shown that acquiring the ability requires approximately four hours visual experience in direct sun-
light. This is required in order to learn the relationship between sun position and time of  day, which is 
crucial to the operation of  the bird’s navigation system.
As a matter of  fact, virtually all Alder Flycatcher experience at least four hours of  direct sunlight, 
and so virtually all members of  the species develop the ability to navigate by the sun.
Participants in the neuroscience condition received a vignette that was exactly the same except 
that this phrase “learn the relationship between sun position and time of  day” in the third paragraph 
was replaced with “activate a photosensitive region of  the brain, called the suprachiasmic nucleus.”
All participants were then asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the statement: “navigation 
in the Alder Flycatcher is innate.” Answers were recorded on a scale from 1 (“d isagree”) to 7 (“agree”).
The results were exactly what one would predict if  the three‐feature theory were correct. In 
other words, there was no significant difference between participants’ responses in the learning 
condition (M = 4.7, SD = 1.9), and the neuroscience condition (M = 5.1, SD = 2.0). But if  this is 
so – if  people exhibit insensitivity to learning‐theoretic considerations – why does scientific 
research that deploys the concept of  innateness invariably conform to the truism that learned 
traits are not innate? We return to this issue in Section 35.5.
35.4.2 Value and Folk Innateness Judgments
As mentioned earlier, considerations of  value appear to exert little or no influence in which traits 
are claimed by cognitive scientists to be innate. Yet over the past decade or so, there has been a 
steady accumulation of  research suggesting that value judgments exert a surprisingly large 
influence on ordinary folk thought about apparently straightforwardly factual matters. To take 
one example, consider the way that people ordinarily decide whether an agent has performed a 
behavior “intentionally.” It might initially appear that people’s answers should be determined 
entirely by their beliefs about the agent’s mental states (what she believes, what she wants, etc.). 
But a series of  studies appear to indicate that something more is actually involved. People’s intu-
itions about whether a behavior was performed intentionally can actually be influenced by their 
value judgments (Ditto, Pizarro, and Tannenbaum 2009; Knobe 2003; nichols and ulatowski 
2007, Cova this volume; but see Machery 2006). Related effects have been observed for people’s 
use of  numerous other concepts, including the concepts of  causation (Alicke 2000; Hitchcock 
and Knobe 2009; Livengood and Rose this volume), knowledge (Beebe and Buckwalter 2010; 
Beebe this volume), freedom (Phillips and Knobe 2009; Young and Phillips 2011; Chan et al. this 
volume) and the distinction between doing and allowing (Cushman, Knobe, and Sinnott‐
Armstrong 2008). These various effects appear to be deeply similar, and it seems plausible that 
they all have the same underlying cause (Knobe 2010).
Against this background, Knobe and Samuels sought to determine whether value judgments 
exert a similar influence on folk innateness judgments. In one experiment, participants were 
assigned either to an “abilities condition” or to a “disabilities condition.” Each participant then 
read one or the other version of  the following vignette:
A baby was born with a rare genetic condition. The doctors told the baby’s parents: “If  this baby 
drinks its mother’s milk during its first two weeks of  life, it will grow up to have extraordinary mental 
abilities that make it able to solve very complicated math problems [serious psychological disabilities 
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that make it unable to solve even very simple math problems]. However, if  you instead give it this 
expensive formula we sometimes use, it won’t develop the extraordinary abilities and will just be 
normal.”
The parents said: “We have decided not to give the baby the expensive formula. We will just be 
feeding it with its mother’s milk.”
As expected, the baby grew up to have extraordinary mental abilities that made it able to solve very 
complicated math problems [serious psychological disabilities that make it unable to solve even very 
simple math problems].
After reading this vignette, participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the 
sentence: “The baby’s extraordinary mental abilities [psychological disabilities] were innate.” 
Participants marked their answer on a scale from 1 (“disagree”) to 7 (“agree”).
Participants gave higher innateness ratings when the parents’ action led to special abilities 
(M = 4.7, SD = 1.9) than when it led to disabilities (M = 3.3, SD = 1.7).
Although these results are suggestive of  the claim that innateness judgments are influenced 
by value judgments, taken in isolation, this result in clearly consistent with alternative interpre-
tations. For example, people might simply believe that abilities (or functional traits) are more 
likely to be innate than disabilities are.
To rule out this kind of  alternative interpretation, Knobe and Samuels conducted a second 
study, in which participants were given no information about the nature of  the trait itself. Instead 
they were told only about the genetic and environmental factors that caused the trait to arise. 
The prediction then was that people would be more inclined to regard the trait as innate when the 
environmental factors were morally good than when they were morally bad.
Twenty students volunteered to fill out a questionnaire in the Yale university dining hall in 
exchange for $1. Participants were assigned either to the decent treatment condition or to the 
bad treatment condition. Each participant then read one or the other version of  the following 
vignette:
Imagine that scientists are trying to understand how people develop a particular trait, which they 
have come to call Trait X. The scientists have discovered a surprising fact about people’s genes. They 
have discovered that people’s genes work in such a way that almost everyone will end up developing 
Trait X. In fact, it turns out that children develop Trait X as long as their parents sometimes offer them 
at least a decent level of  treatment [treat them badly].
now, just about everyone’s parents offer them at least a decent level of  treatment [treat them badly] 
at least sometimes. So, given the way people’s genes work, just about everyone actually does develop 
Trait X.
After reading this vignette, participants were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the s entence: 
“Trait X is innate.” Participants marked their answer on a scale from 1 (“disagree”) to 7 (“agree”).
As predicted by Knobe and Samuels, participants were more inclined to rate the trait as innate 
when it was the product of  being treated decently (M = 4.6, SD = 1.9) than when it was the prod-
uct of  being treated badly (M = 2.7, SD = 1.9). This result lends further support to the view that 
people’s value judgments are impacting their intuitions about innateness.
35.5 Innateness judgments among Scientists
So far we have considered the issue of  how naïve subjects deploy the concept of  innateness. An 
obvious next question to ask is whether scientific disciplines that invoke a concept of  innateness 
deploy a distinctively scientific concept or merely redeploy the folk one.
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35.5.1 Hypotheses
notice that the pattern of  intuitions outlined in Section  35.4 – that moral considerations 
influence folk innateness judgments but that learning‐theoretic considerations do not – is quite 
antithetical to what one should expect to find in systematic scientific inquiry. The lack of  influence 
exerted by learning‐theoretic considerations is surprising because, as already noted, it is no more 
than a banal truism in the relevant sciences that learned traits are not innate. Indeed, to our 
knowledge, no hypothesis in psychology – or any related science, for that matter – has ever p osited 
traits that are both innate and learned.
The influence exerted by values on folk innateness judgments is similarly antithetical to what one 
would expect to find in systematic scientific inquiry. There are, of  course, many difficult q uestions 
about the role of  value judgments in scientific inquiry, and different scientists may adopt different 
views about these questions (Douglas 2009). nevertheless, it is doubtful that s cientists would accept 
the kind of  pattern we find in folk intuitions about innateness. Specifically, it seems remarkable that 
two scientists who agreed on all the purely descriptive facts in a given case, and disagreed only about 
their moral significance, should end up disagreeing about any purely scientific issue. Certainly, there 
are no examples of  innateness hypotheses from recent s cience that exhibit this pattern.
Assuming that this is so, what cognitive processes might explain these departures in a scientific 
context from the folk innateness judgments elicited in the studies outlined earlier? Three main 
hypotheses come to mind:
Overwriting: Scientific training leads to the elimination of  the folk concept of  innateness and its 
replacement by a scientific concept. Among other things, this new concept would emphasize 
the distinction between learned and non‐learned capacities, and it would have no place for the 
sorts of  value considerations outlined earlier.
Conceptual Addition: More scientific patterns of  innateness judgments depend in part on the 
acquisition of  a new scientific concept, but without the loss of  the old one. On this view, 
s cientists hold onto the folk concept but also acquire a scientific one that they use under 
appropriate conditions – such as those that obtain when doing science.
Both of  these proposals assume some augmentation of  the scientist’s conceptual resources – 
presumably as a result of  appropriate professional training. But there is a third option, which 
Knobe and Samuels called the filtering hypothesis:
Filtering: Scientists never acquire a distinctively scientific concept of  innateness. Instead they con-
tinue to use the folk concept. However, in arriving at judgments about individual cases scientists 
do not rely merely have the innateness concept; they also have certain general principles about 
which considerations are relevant to innateness judgments. If  they see that a pattern of  judg-
ments would violate these general principles, this pattern of  judgments will be “filtered out” and a 
different pattern will be used in its place. So, for example, on the filtering hypothesis, scientists 
never acquire a new concept of  innateness in which value judgments play no role. Rather, they 
continue to have a concept in which value judgments do play some role, but they also adhere to a 
general principle that says “Do not allow your judgments about innateness to be affected by your 
value judgments.” When they see explicitly that their judgments are violating this principle, they 
reject these judgments and try to answer the question in a way that shows no influence of  values.
35.5.2 Predictions
notice that the above three hypotheses make quite different predictions about how the patterns 
of  judgments exhibited by folk and scientists in the relevant fields. If  the overwriting hypothesis 
is true, we should expect scientists in the relevant fields only to exhibit a pattern of  innateness 
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judgments in which learning‐theoretic considerations exert an influence and moral ones 
do not.
If  the conceptual addition hypothesis is correct, we should expect a systematic difference b etween 
folk innateness judgments and those make by scientists in the relevant disciplines. Scientists 
might sometimes use the folk innateness concept, and so exhibit the folk pattern of  judgments. 
But when they have time to reflect carefully on a given case and use their scientific approach 
(while avoiding the influence of  their folk concept), we should expect them to make innateness 
judgments that are sensitive to learning‐theoretic considerations, but not moral ones. In contrast, 
the folk should never exhibit this pattern of  sensitivity and insensitivity since, by assumption, 
they lack the distinct and purely scientific concept of  innateness.
Finally, if  the filtering hypothesis is correct, we should expect scientists’ patterns of  innateness 
judgments to sometimes be the same as the folk pattern, and sometimes to exhibit the characteristic 
scientific pattern. In this regard, it makes the same predictions as the conceptual addition hypo-
thesis. Where the two hypotheses diverge, however, is in their predictions about folk judgments. In 
contrast to the conceptual addition hypothesis, which predicts that folk will not manifest the 
scientific pattern, the filtering hypothesis allows that non‐specialists may, under appropriate cir-
cumstances, exhibit the characteristic pattern of  judgments. This is because the filtering hypo-
thesis does not presuppose that the scientific pattern in innateness judgments results from the 
acquisition of  special scientific concepts or knowledge. Instead it is wholly compatible with the idea 
that the relevant filtering processes are available to scientists and non‐scientists alike. In view of  
this, if  it were to turn out that people with no relevant scientific training also exhibit the distinc-
tively scientific pattern of  judgment, we would have reason to prefer filtering to conceptual addition.
35.5.3 Experiments
In order to adjudicate between these competing hypotheses, Knobe and Samuels conducted a 
large online questionnaire study. Participants were recruited from two very different populations. 
The first population was a sample of  researchers actively working in fields that used the concept 
of  innateness – for example, psychology, linguistics, and biology. The second population – 
the non‐researchers – was composed of  people who might be generally scientifically literate but 
who had no special training in disciplines which deploy the concept of  innateness.
Within each of  these groups, we compared the judgments participants made when they were 
focusing on individual cases to the judgments they made when they were focusing more on gen-
eral principles. In particular, we presented the kinds of  vignettes outlined in Section 35.3, but used 
the “joint‐separate” technique (Hsee 1996). Participants were assigned to either a case‐based 
condition in which they received just one condition from each of  the pairs of  cases in a between‐
subject design, or they were assigned to a principled condition in which they received both versions 
and were asked explicitly whether there was any relevant difference between the two. This latter 
way of  presenting the question tends to make participants think in a more principled way about 
which considerations are and are not relevant; and this, we supposed, might allow us to discrim-
inate between the filtering and conceptual addition hypotheses by facilitating whatever tendency 
there might be for participants to filter out their intuitive responses.
Procedure. Each participant received, in random order, the three questions outlined earlier: the 
Mother’s Milk question, the Trait X question, and the Learning question. Each participant was assigned 
either to the case‐based condition or to the principled condition. Participants in the case‐based 
condition received each of  the questions in precisely the same form used in the earlier experiments. 
Hence, for each question, each participant was randomly assigned to receive one or the other condition. 
By contrast, participants in the principled condition received two versions of  each vignette in a within‐
subject design. Within each vignette type, the order of  the two versions was counterbalanced.
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Participants in the principled condition were told at the outset that the two versions differed 
only in a few words (which were underlined for easy identification) and that we specifically 
wanted to know whether they thought that this difference was relevant to whether the trait was 
innate. After reading each version, they were asked to rate their agreement with the statement 
about innateness for that version. Finally, after getting an innateness rating for each statement, 
they were given a few lines to “explain why the difference between the two passages either was or 
was not relevant to the question of  innateness.”
Finally, participants were asked whether they were working in philosophical or scientific 
research. Those who answered yes to this question were then asked to indicate an area of  
specialization from the options: “psychology,” “genetics,” “linguistics,” “biology” and “other.” Each 
researcher was free to classify herself  as falling into multiple categories.
Results. Out of  a total of  6549 participants who completed the entire questionnaire 1506 
indicated that they were researchers. More specifically, there were 350 psychologists, 89 
geneticists, 158 linguists, 435 biologists, 221 philosophers and 557 who indicated that they 
fell in some other category. Means and standard deviations for each condition are displayed in 
Table 35.1.
Mother’s Milk: In the case‐based version, people gave higher ratings in the abilities condition 
(M = 4.56) than in the disabilities condition (M = 3.90). In the principled version, there was 
only a small difference between ratings for the abilities condition (M = 4.62) and the disabil-
ities condition (M = 4.33), but because of  the very large sample size, this small difference 
was statistically significant. In short: in the principled condition the effect of  value – enhanced 
ability as opposed to disability – was substantially reduced. But equally importantly for our 
purposes, the populations of  researchers and non‐researchers behaved in much the same 
manner. In the case‐based condition both groups were equally prone to the influence of  value; 
and in the principled condition, the influence of  value was similarly reduced.
Trait X: In the case‐based version, we again found that people gave higher ratings in the decent 
treatment condition (M = 4.10) than in the bad treatment condition (M = 3.48. In the principled 
version, this difference was small (3.92–3.79), but still significant. In short: in the principled 
condition the effect of  value was substantially reduced. But equally importantly, the popula-
tions of  researchers and non‐researchers behaved in much the same manner. As with the 
Mother’s Milk question, in the case‐based condition both groups were equally prone to the 
influence of  value; and in the principled condition, the influence of  value was similarly reduced.
Learning: In the case‐based version, the difference between ratings for the learning condition 
(M = 4.61) and the neuroscience condition (M = 4.75) was quite small, but still significant. 
In  the principled condition, there was a more substantial difference between the learning 
condition (M = 4.2) and the neuroscience condition (M = 5.3). Moreover, and equally impor-
tantly, both the researcher and non‐researcher populations exhibited much the same pattern. 
That is, in the case‐based condition neither group’s judgments were much influenced by 
learning‐theoretic considerations, whereas in the principled condition learning‐theoretic 
considerations exerted a far more substantial influence.
Implications. What implications do these results have for the relative plausibility of  the three 
hypotheses outlined in Section 35.5.1? First, the data count against the overwrite hypothesis. On 
this hypothesis, specialist researchers should no longer have any vestige of  the folk concept and 
should, therefore, show the distinctively scientific pattern of  judgments, even in the case‐based 
condition. Yet this is not what happens. Rather it is only in the principled condition that researchers’ 
innateness judgments are influenced learning‐theoretic considerations and not moral ones.
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Second, the data suggest that the conceptual addition hypothesis is implausible. On this 
h ypothesis specialized scientific training is required for the acquisition of  new conceptual 
resources that non‐researcher simply do not have. In which case, we should expect researchers 
to differ from non‐researchers in the principled condition. But this is not what the data suggest. 
Rather, researchers and non‐researchers behave alike in both conditions.
This leaves the filtering hypothesis as the one best supported. Indeed, the results are precisely 
what one would expect if  the filtering hypothesis were true. Within the case‐based condition, 
both ordinary folk and trained scientists are influenced by moral considerations. However, when 
the experimental stimuli are designed in such a way that participants become explicitly aware 
that the question is about an influence of  value considerations they filter out the result of  their 
usual intuition and instead conclude that this factor is not relevant. (Thus, participants in the 
principled condition were both less inclined to attribute innateness in morally good cases and 
more inclined to attribute innateness in morally bad cases.) Similarly, people’s intuitions are 
sometimes insensitive to the distinction between learned and non‐learned traits, but when they 
see explicitly that the question targets this distinction, they adjust their usual intuitions and 
c onclude that the distinction is a relevant one. Overall, then, the present results suggest that 
s cientists have not replaced or supplemented the folk concept innateness with a purely scientific 
one. Instead, it seems that scientists continue to use the folk concept but that, on reflection, they 
reject those aspects of  the concept that they deem unhelpful in scientific research.
35.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I first set out the evidence for the three‐feature account of  folk innateness judg-
ments. Second, I argued that this evidence fails to bolster the standard criticism of  the innateness 
concept. Finally, I presented evidence which supports a filtering hypothesis about scientific 
innateness judgments, and thereby supports one presupposition of  the standard criticism –
namely that scientists use the same folk innateness concept that non‐scientists use. This may 
appear to be bad news for the role of  innateness concept in the sciences. After all, if  the folk con-
cept is problematic, then so too is the one that figures in scientific innateness judgments. Even so, 
the filtering hypothesis also points in the direction of  an oft‐neglected possibility. Problematic 
concepts can be used for beneficial theoretical and explanatory purposes in the sciences. This is 
plausibly true of  such concepts as gene, species, and element; and as Fiona Cowie recently argued, 
the same may be true of  the innateness concept as well (Cowie 2009). The filtering hypothesis 
Table 35.1 Descriptive Statistics for Experiment Comparing Scientist and non‐Scientist Innateness 
judgments
Case‐based Principled
Folk Researchers Folk Researchers
Mother’s Milk Ability 4.56 (2.27) 4.51 (2.15) 4.67 (2.35) 4.51 (2.22)
Disability 3.95 (2.38) 3.72 (2.30) 4.36 (2.39) 4.26 (2.26)
Trait X Decent 4.13 (2.32) 4.09 (2.29) 4.08 (2.38) 3.80 (2.32)
Bad 3.40 (2.27) 3.65 (2.26) 3.94 (2.37) 3.70 (2.31)
Learning neuroscience 5.02 (2.18) 4.66 (2.20) 5.34 (2.12) 5.19 (2.08)
Learning 4.55 (2.34) 4.78 (2.31) 4.16 (2.39) 4.13 (2.33)
Inference 4.76 (2.22) 4.73 (2.19) n/A n/A
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suggests one kind of  process which may facilitate the beneficial use of  problematic concepts in 
general, and the folk innateness concept, in particular. under the appropriate circumstances – 
when we have time to reflect, and the informational context is structured in a manner that facil-
itates attention to relevant factors and salient general principles – the deleterious inferential 
effects of  a concept can be filtered out and substituted by preferable inferential patterns.
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